The recent requests by Abdolnaser Hemmati, Governor of the Central Bank of Iran, to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—access to Special Drawing Rights (SDR) resources, utilization of credit and technical capacities, and the pursuit of quota reform—enjoy legal legitimacy within the Fund's Articles of Agreement. However, an analysis of their feasibility reveals that the primary obstacle lies not in the legal text, but in the political architecture of its implementation: the voluntary mechanism for SDR conversion, the US de facto veto in the Executive Board, and US domestic legal mandates have effectively blocked any meaningful financial access in the short term.
Financial Status: Nominal Ownership vs. Practical Liquidity
As of February 28, 2026, Iran holds approximately 5.5 billion SDRs in book-entry assets at the IMF—comprising 5,047.7 million SDRs (104.18% of its quota) and a 517.49 million SDR Reserve Tranche Position. While CBI Governor Hemmati asserts access to these resources as a fundamental legal right, a stark distinction exists between nominal ownership and practical liquidity. SDRs are potential drawing rights, not freely usable currency, and their conversion relies on voluntary trading arrangements. Consequently, stringent US banking restrictions effectively freeze these assets, leaving an estimated $7 billion in Iranian funds practically inaccessible despite formal legal entitlement.
The Legal-Political Obstacle: US Domestic Law as an External Constraint
The primary barrier to Iran's SDR conversion is entrenched in US domestic legislation and Washington's de facto veto power at the IMF. Two congressional bills—the "No US Financing for Iran Act" (H.R. 5921) and the "Iran SDR Exchange Prohibition Act" (H.R. 6840)—statutorily mandate the US Treasury to direct the US Executive Director to (1) oppose any IMF financial assistance and SDR allocations to Iran, and (2) pressure member states to prohibit the exchange of Iranian SDRs. With the US Treasury openly admitting to leading efforts to block "rejected" governments from utilizing their SDRs, this geopolitical strategy has effectively transformed Iran's holdings into frozen book-entry assets—preserving nominal legal ownership while severing the conversion channel. Crucially, this blockade is not a legal sanction for violating the IMF's Articles of Agreement, but rather a stark exercise of political power outside the Fund's legal framework. Consequently, while Iran's legal demand remains wholly legitimate, its enforcement is held hostage by a party unwilling to execute it.
Credit Capacity and Technical Assistance: The Only Relatively Open Avenues
In the realm of credit facilities, the situation is even more complex. The approval of any financial arrangement for Iran in the Executive Board is practically impossible, given the US' approximately 17 percent voting share and its statutory obligation to oppose. The precedent of Iran's 2020 request for a $5 billion loan and US opposition illustrates a recurring pattern in which membership rights do not equate to access to resources.
The only area where real—albeit limited—progress is observable is technical assistance. The Fund has agreed to the Central Bank's formal request for technical assistance on "energy subsidy targeting," with in-person sessions planned at the Fund's regional centers in Austria or Singapore. Jihad Azour also emphasized "continued dialogue and expansion of technical cooperation" in his meeting with Hemmati. This area has remained relatively open because it lacks a financial-credit nature and is not tied to sensitive political authorizations.
Quota Reform: A Legitimate Goal, a Long-Term Horizon
Iran's proposal for a "meaningful realignment of quotas" within the framework of the 17th General Review aligns with BRICS positions. In September 2026, BRICS called for the timely implementation of the quota increases agreed upon in the 16th Review and the development of approaches for meaningful realignment in the 17th Review to reflect the shifting weight of emerging economies. However, any change in quotas requires an 85 percent majority of votes, which activates the US de facto veto. The experience of the delayed implementation of the 16th Review due to the US Congress's failure to approve it demonstrates that even nominal consensus is vulnerable to US domestic constraints.
Bottom line
While Iran’s demands for SDR access and credit are legally unassailable under IMF Articles, they remain economically unenforceable due to the voluntary nature of SDR conversions and the US de facto veto. Technical assistance stands as the sole politically feasible avenue. Strategically, Iran must pivot from pursuing abstract legal claims to managing institutional relations pragmatically—advancing quota reforms through multilateral coalitions while utilizing technical cooperation as the only viable mechanism to sustain engagement with the Fund.
