On February 28, 2026, just as negotiations between Iran and the United States were making positive progress, the United States and Israel jointly launched military strikes against Iran, triggering the US–Israeli–Iranian war that remains ongoing today. This war is a continuation of the “12-day war” that Israel launched against Iran in June 2025. Between these two wars imposed on it, Iran also experienced a period of social unrest that resulted in significant casualties. Wars and domestic unrest occurring in close succession have placed Iran, long subjected to international sanctions, under severe pressure.
Yet, to the surprise of many outside observers, the Islamic Republic of Iran has not collapsed; instead, its geopolitical position has improved significantly. How should we understand the wars and domestic unrest Iran has experienced since last year? How has Iran—a country long subjected to sanctions, beset by serious internal problems, and militarily far weaker than the United States—resisted on the battlefield? And how should Tehran respond to the concerns of people seeking improvements in the current situation? These two concurrent forms of resistance, together with the predicament Iran continues to face, merit observation and reflection.
From the “12-Day War” to Internal Challenges
On June 13, 2025, while Iran and the United States were engaged in diplomatic communication over a nuclear agreement and the lifting of sanctions, Israel launched a surprise attack against Iran, seeking to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran, which it regarded as its foremost external security threat. This marked the beginning of the “12-day war” between Iran and Israel. In addition to the deaths of several important military and political leaders and nuclear scientists that day, Iran’s air defense network suffered severe disruption, and some central command nodes were damaged. This prevented an immediate counterattack and placed the country in extreme danger.
However, less than 12 hours after Israel announced that it had destroyed Iran’s capacity to retaliate, Iran regained that capacity and began sustained launches of ballistic missiles and drones against Israel. Pressure then mounted sharply on Israel, whose small territory offered little strategic depth, and it repeatedly called on the United States to enter the war. On June 22, the United States directly bombed three Iranian nuclear facilities and quickly withdrew from combat. US intervention placed Iran under pressure that was difficult to withstand, while the rapid US withdrawal after the bombing also made it difficult for Israel to face Iran alone. Israel and Iran had no choice but to accept a ceasefire arrangement, and on June 25, the 12-day war ended.
Many international observers, however, considered this merely a temporary ceasefire between Israel and Iran. Israel had failed to achieve its objectives of destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities and ballistic missile capabilities, much less overthrowing the Islamic Republic of Iran—the very reasons it had launched the war. This suggested that Iran remained an existential threat in Israel’s eyes, and that further weakening Iran and overthrowing the Islamic Republic remained the objectives of Israel’s campaign against Iran.
Meanwhile, after the painful experience of the “12-day war,” Iranian society yearned for change and hoped the country would undertake substantial reforms. Unfortunately, the changes people expected did not fully materialize. Meanwhile, Iran continued to face economic challenges, including currency depreciation, rising prices, and administrative difficulties. These conditions led to public protests in Iran at the end of 2025, continuing the Iranian people’s years-long resistance against a status quo with which they were dissatisfied.
Iran’s domestic unrest provided Israel, the United States, and other anti-Iranian forces with an opportunity to intervene. US President Donald Trump publicly supported the protesters, encouraged Iranians to take to the streets to overthrow the existing “regime”, and explicitly stated that US assistance to that end was “on its way.” Israel also repeatedly emphasized the Islamic Republic of Iran’s vulnerability. In particular, its intelligence organization, Mossad, publicly declared that its operatives were among the protesters, standing with the Iranian people. Reza Pahlavi, the US-based son of Iran’s former shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, sought to present himself, with Israeli support, as a new political force that could replace the Islamic Republic.
Encouragement from external forces, including the United States and Israel, and especially Israel’s longstanding espionage activities against Iran, caused the unrest to escalate rapidly. Violent acts, including the burning of public places and property, became increasingly frequent, and calls to overthrow the existing government grew louder. In this challenging situation, Iranian authorities took measures on January 8–9, 2026, to restore order in Tehran and other cities. Iranian authorities announced that 3,117 people had died in the unrest, while different accounts of the casualties have also emerged.
Because the unrest also resulted in deaths and injuries among protesters, social tensions persisted even after order was restored, highlighting the importance of addressing public concerns and pursuing reform. Under these circumstances, different political currents in Iran continued to debate the country's future and the appropriate pace of change. Israel and the United States, however, believed that the Islamic Republic was extremely weak and could easily be overthrown. Thus, just as Iran was seeking to address domestic challenges and pursue national development, another war was imposed upon it.
Another War Imposed on Iran by the US and Israel
On February 28, 2026, just two days after the United States and Iran concluded fairly positive indirect talks in Geneva, the United States and Israel jointly launched large-scale bombing raids against Iran. Once again, Iran faced a war imposed on it. On the opening day of this war, Iran’s Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei and a number of senior political and military figures were martyred in the bombing. Yet Iran’s state system did not cease functioning because its highest leader had been killed. The Islamic Republic is not a political system that depends solely on the Leader to operate. Iran also has established arrangements for the temporary exercise of power and the election of a new leader should an unexpected event befall the Leader.
Furthermore, before this latest US–Israeli attack, war was already widely anticipated within Iran. Indeed, since the previous war, Iran had been preparing for the next one. Consequently, within tens of minutes of coming under attack, Iran launched fierce strikes against Israel and US military facilities in the Middle East, thwarting at a stroke the prewar US–Israeli plan for a swift victory.
Notably, despite their concerns about the country’s situation, Iranians did not join the United States and Israel in seeking to overthrow the Islamic Republic, contrary to the expectations of the Netanyahu and Trump administrations. Instead, after witnessing the bombing of their country and the loss of innocent lives, and seeing Iranian political and military leaders step forward to resist, many Iranians rallied around the country’s defense against external aggression.
Meanwhile, because the legitimacy and necessity of the Trump administration’s war against Iran were widely questioned in the United States, support for the war was a minority position even within the United States itself. US allies did not actively cooperate in the war against Iran either; some at most secretly provided support that did not involve direct participation in combat. Consequently, as the war became bogged down, President Trump and his administration repeatedly criticized their allies’ inaction. Setbacks on the battlefield also prompted Trump to make statements that caused an international outcry. On April 7, for example, he went so far as to threaten the complete destruction of Iranian civilization that very night.
Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz was another headache for the United States during the war. After the war broke out, Iran finally turned its longstanding verbal threat to close the strait into reality for the first time, severely disrupting global markets for energy, fertilizers, and other products. The war’s enormous negative impact rapidly spread from the Persian Gulf to the rest of the world, further increasing pressure on the United States as the country that had initiated the war.
Although some Middle Eastern countries were deeply angered by Iranian attacks on targets within their territories, including US military bases—and countries such as the United Arab Emirates even launched retaliatory strikes against Iran—most were even more dissatisfied with the United States and Israel for starting the war. Particularly after Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, a conduit for global energy supplies, regional countries became the most severely affected. Thus, amid the fighting, some countries took active steps to mediate diplomatically between the United States and Iran.
Through the joint mediation efforts of Pakistan and other countries, the United States and Iran reached a temporary two-week ceasefire agreement on April 8. On June 17, the presidents of the two countries signed the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, which more closely reflected Tehran’s positions, as a framework for negotiations on a final end to the war. However, profound mutual distrust between the United States and Iran, compounded by Israeli obstruction, resulted in piecemeal implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the memorandum. On July 8, the United States bombed Bandar Abbas in southern Iran and other locations, and fighting between the United States and Iran resumed. To this day, the two countries have not reached an agreement to end the war, and control of the Strait of Hormuz remains a focal point of their confrontation.
Limited air and long-range military operations alone can hardly force Iran to accept US terms for ending the war, while the United States is currently unable to launch a large-scale war requiring substantial ground forces. Forced to change course, the Trump administration announced an “economic suffocation” campaign against Iran on August 24, extending sanctions to all countries trading with Iran in an attempt to force its surrender. Ironically, the Trump administration launched this war precisely because longstanding sanctions against Iran had proved ineffective. Now Washington believes that economic sanctions can win a war that has already reached a stalemate.
At present, this new unilateral US sanctions initiative, already opposed and criticized by numerous countries, is unlikely to force Iran to surrender. If the United States insists on implementing it, one or both of the following outcomes are highly likely: first, some countries whose interests are harmed will confront the United States; second, Iran will resist through military means. Washington would find either outcome difficult to bear.
Iran’s Resistance on Two Fronts
Facing two wars imposed upon it within just a few months, while having to fight the United States, the world’s foremost power, would place any country today under immense pressure. Iran’s situation is even more difficult: it has already endured severe sanctions for decades and experienced serious domestic social unrest between the two wars. The predicament facing Iran, and especially the Islamic Republic of Iran, is readily apparent.
Yet when their girls’ primary school was bombed; when their hospitals, historical and cultural heritage sites, and infrastructure, including oil facilities and water plants, became targets; when the United States and Israel encouraged Kurds to dismember their country; and when President Trump explicitly threatened to destroy Iranian civilization completely, the Iranian people understood that this was not merely a war against the “Iranian regime,” but a war to destroy Iran itself. Therefore, in confronting the war imposed on Iran by Israel and the United States, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, the regular armed forces, government officials, and the Iranian public are united in their resistance: they are determined to defeat external enemies and defend national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national dignity.
Iran certainly also has the capacity to respond to external military strikes. The Islamic Republic has consistently prioritized military development based on domestic manufacturing. It has established a fairly mature conventional long-range strike system and possesses the Middle East’s most significant ballistic missile and drone forces. Iran’s greatest advantage lies in its ability to integrate ballistic missiles, drones, and cruise missiles into a system capable of sustained combined attacks, with relatively low strike costs. Thus, although Iran cannot easily defeat Israel and the United States on the battlefield, neither can they easily defeat Iran through military means.
Furthermore, although longstanding sanctions have caused Iran immense difficulties and severely weakened it, they have also led the country to develop ways to circumvent some sanctions and maintain basic trade and international exchanges. After years of hardship, the Iranian people’s tolerance for difficulties also exceeds what the outside world imagines, helping Iran resist US–Israeli strikes.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has an even stronger determination to resist. In the eyes of Tehran’s decision-makers, this is the final war with the United States and Israel: either the Islamic Republic falls, or it compels the other side to accept its conditions, ensuring an end to periodic military attacks and prolonged economic sanctions. This view is a natural response to past and current US–Israeli policies.
The successive wars and domestic unrest since last June, together with the recent US intensification of sanctions through its so-called “economic suffocation” campaign, clearly demonstrate that overthrowing the Islamic Republic remains an established objective of the United States and Israel, especially Israel. Consequently, in addition to resisting external enemies in defense of the country, in line with the Iranian people’s demands, the Islamic Republic is also struggling for its own survival.
Accordingly, without substantial gains, Tehran’s decision-makers will not agree to end the war. Instead, they will choose continued resistance and may even proactively escalate confrontation with external enemies when necessary. In these circumstances, the pursuit of jurisdiction over the Strait of Hormuz has become a concrete expression of Tehran’s resistance against the United States. The idea that limited military strikes or intensified economic sanctions can force Tehran to submit is unrealistic.
If the United States, as the initiator of the war, does not make compromises acceptable to Tehran, the current tensions in the Persian Gulf will persist. This situation will cause increasing harm to the Iranian people. First, they are the principal victims of international sanctions. Second, as the pressure of war eases somewhat, domestic political and social concerns that had temporarily receded may become more pronounced. The war has already contributed to higher prices and further depreciation of the national currency. If, as after last year’s “12-day war,” public expectations for improvement remain unmet, social discontent may persist.
Thus, from the perspective of Tehran’s decision-makers, there are also reasons to continue the resistance. The urgent question now confronting them is when and how to bring the war to an end. Different views on this question have already emerged within Iran.
Throughout its long history and amid today’s harsh realities, Iran has never lacked the will to resist external enemies. Throughout more than a century of national development, the Iranian people’s resistance against the status quo has also persisted. Iran’s current decision-makers urgently need to bring these two forms of resistance together into a coordinated force for national progress. The best path is for decision-makers to respond to public expectations for development and improved living conditions, thereby further strengthening the country’s ability to resist external threats.
Once those external security threats are removed, the country can embark on a sound path of development. After all, development is what truly matters for a country.
Professor Hongda Fan is director of the China–Middle East Center at Shaoxing University and visiting scholar at the Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore.
