Kamran Karami
The recent Manama Dialogue once again placed Iran–GCC relations at the center of regional and international attention. Statements by Arab foreign ministers during the conference revealed a growing recognition that regional security cannot be achieved without constructive engagement with Tehran. Oman’s foreign minister called on members of the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council to adopt a policy of dialogue with Iran and other states long perceived as rivals, while Bahrain’s top diplomat emphasized that genuine, multidimensional security in the Persian Gulf depends on sustained cooperation and a diplomatic resolution of Iran’s nuclear issue.
These remarks echo the broader diplomatic momentum of recent years, particularly the gradual normalization of Iran’s ties with Persian Gulf Arab states since 2021. Yet, the deeper context of this shift lies in the GCC’s Regional Security Vision Document, published in March 2024 — a 15-page framework outlining how the six member states perceive evolving threats, opportunities, and mechanisms for collective action in an era of strategic uncertainty.
The document is built around four key pillars.
First, the concept of indivisible security, meaning that a threat to one member is viewed as a threat to all, reinforcing the need for coordinated defense responses.
Second, the fusion of traditional and emerging threats, expanding the agenda beyond conventional rivalries — including Iran, terrorism, and intra-regional competition — to encompass energy security, maritime safety, cyber threats, and climate change.
Third, a strategy of dual diplomacy and deterrence, combining the expansion of defense capacities with intensified regional and international diplomacy.
Finally, the document stresses global trade and energy security, underscoring the need to safeguard maritime routes and ensure stable energy flows while maintaining cooperation with external powers.
In defining its approach to the external environment, the GCC outlines three concentric levels — peripheral, regional, and global — which reveal four key dynamics.
The first is a symbolic yet pragmatic unity: while the GCC emphasizes cohesion on paper, each state continues to pursue its own national strategies. Saudi Arabia and the UAE focus on economic reform and defense modernization; Qatar and Oman prioritize mediation and soft diplomacy; Kuwait and Bahrain lie somewhere in between. This divergence underscores that collective declarations often coexist with policy fragmentation on the ground.
The second dynamic is active balancing. Persian Gulf states are now institutionalizing a calibrated equilibrium between the United States — their traditional security partner — and emerging global actors such as China, Russia, and the European Union. They aim to leverage economic ties with Beijing while preserving security commitments with Washington, reflecting a shift toward multi-alignment rather than dependency.
The third is domestic resilience, achieved through economic diversification, massive infrastructure investment, and safeguarding the continuity of energy exports and trade routes. In this sense, internal stability is now considered a strategic layer of security.
The fourth and most transformative dimension concerns regional partnerships. The GCC is moving from “defensive passivity” to “active regional agency,” seeking cooperative mechanisms with neighboring states — particularly Iran — and regional organizations. This shift, however, requires confidence-building and the resolution of intra-Persian Gulf differences.
New Perception
When viewed through this prism, the management of relations with Iran emerges as a core test of the GCC’s new framework. Unlike in past decades, the perception of Iran among Persian Gulf states has evolved: Saudi Arabia and the UAE now see engagement with Tehran as part of a broader diversification of their political and economic portfolios. Enhancing maritime security, ensuring energy transit stability, and linking security to climate and economic adaptability are all areas where cooperation with Iran is increasingly seen as beneficial rather than adversarial.
Practical steps could include establishing joint economic funds, conducting limited information exchanges on defense and environmental risks, and organizing transparent joint exercises focused on nontraditional threats such as climate security. Still, only half of this transformation lies within the GCC’s framework — the other half depends on Iran’s readiness to align its regional approach with this emerging order.
Tehran, which has proposed multiple regional security initiatives in the past, now needs to operationalize them through tangible, trust-building measures that acknowledge the sensitivities of Persian Gulf partners. Moving beyond selective bilateral ties with Iraq, Oman, and Qatar toward a comprehensive regional strategy that includes Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan could enable Iran to position itself as a proactive stakeholder in the evolving Persian Gulf security architecture.
Ultimately, the GCC’s security vision represents a significant attempt to craft a shared vocabulary and conceptual roadmap for a volatile region. For both Iran and its Persian Gulf neighbors, the challenge — and opportunity — lies in translating this emerging language of cooperation into credible, durable mechanisms for managing the uncertainties of tomorrow.
