Many failed economic policies are not the result of poor design or weak implementation, but of a deeper disconnect—between economic reasoning and political logic. In Iran, as in many other countries, the most elegant models and analyses often fail to influence real decisions because they are not translated into a language that resonates with political leaders and their constraints.
An economist advising policymakers must play two roles at once: a rigorous analyst and a skilled political communicator. Without the ability to persuade and frame economic logic within the priorities of decision-makers, expertise alone rarely drives policy change. Political leaders—whose legitimacy depends on short-term popularity and coalition stability—operate under objectives far more volatile than long-term growth or intergenerational welfare. Any economic recommendation that ignores this political calculus is bound to remain on paper, regardless of its scientific merit.
Iran’s policy experience provides striking examples of this gap. The issue is not merely about whether a central banker holds a degree in economics or accounting, but whether those in key economic positions understand and can evaluate the theoretical and practical foundations of policy advice. Even accomplished economists, when unable to navigate the realities of power, interest groups, and communication, often see their well-founded ideas sidelined. The problem lies not only in what economists know, but in how they convey what they know.
Persuasion and packaging are as critical as analysis. An effective advisor must present policy proposals not as abstract models but as politically feasible packages—showing clear trade-offs, implementation pathways, and communication strategies. The art of translating data into decisions requires understanding political incentives, timing, and narrative framing. This is not about compromising scientific integrity but about increasing the chance that sound economic ideas survive contact with politics.
A more constructive approach involves cultivating dual literacy: economic mastery and political acumen. Academic programs that train economists for public service should include modules on stakeholder analysis, negotiation, and policy communication. Advisory institutions need to integrate political and operational assessments into their economic recommendations. Rather than offering idealized blueprints, economists should design adaptable policy packages that reflect varying degrees of political tolerance and administrative capacity.
Equally vital is transparency—acknowledging the uncertainties and short-term costs of reform while suggesting credible compensatory mechanisms. Clear communication of the balance between short-term pain and long-term gain can help policymakers defend reformist decisions to their constituencies. Strengthening the public outreach of expert institutions also matters: when citizens understand the rationale for change, the political cost of economic correction diminishes.
Recognizing the role of politics does not mean surrendering to it. Seeing politics as the field of play—rather than an obstacle—allows economists to remain principled yet pragmatic. The challenge is to preserve analytical rigor while adapting to real-world constraints. Only through this balance can economics move from being an eloquent spectator of policy to a decisive actor in shaping it. Otherwise, even the most insightful analyses will remain confined to libraries, far from the lives they are meant to improve.
